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Abstract
Game theoretic analysis of sequencing situations has been restricted to manufactur-
ing systems which consist of machines that can process only one job at a time. However,
in many manufacturing systems, operations are carried out by batch machines which can
simultaneously process multiple jobs. This paper aims to extend the game theoretical
approach to the cost allocation problems arising from sequencing situations on systems
that consist of batch machines. We ﬁrst consider sequencing situations with a single
batch machine and analyze cooperative games arising from these situations. It is shown
that these games are convex and an expression for the Shapley value of these games
is provided. We also introduce an equal gain splitting rule for these sequencing situa-
tions and provide an axiomatic characterization. Second, we analyze various aspects of
ﬂow-shop sequencing situations which consist of batch machines only. In particular, we
provide two cases in which the cooperative game arising from the ﬂow-shop sequencing
situation is equal to the game arising from a sequencing situation that corresponds to
one speciﬁc machine in the ﬂow-shop.
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Game theoretic analysis of the cost allocation problems arising from sequencing situations
is initiated by Curiel, Pederzoli and Tijs (1989). This study considered one machine se-
quencing situations in which a ﬁnite number of agents, each having one job, are queued in
front of a machine waiting for their jobs to be processed. Agents have linear cost functions
and each group of agents is allowed to obtain cost savings by reordering their jobs. The
problem of the distribution of the maximal cost savings is tackled by analyzing correspond-
ing cooperative sequencing games. It was shown that these games are convex and hence
balanced. Curiel et al. (1989) also introduced the equal gain splitting (EGS) rule for these
one machine sequencing situations and provided an axiomatical characterization.
The following studies in this strand of literature have extended the basic model by
considering ready times (Hamers et al., 1995), due dates (Borm et al., 2002), precedence
relations (Hamers et al., 2005) and controllable processing times (van Velzen, 2006). In each
of these papers, the convexity of the corresponding class of games or of some special sub-
classes is established. Curiel et al. (1993) considered a larger class of sequencing situations
by allowing more general cost functions for the agents. It was shown that these games are
not convex in general but core elements do exist. The β-rule was proposed as an extension
of the EGS rule. This rule was shown to yield outcomes in the core of the corresponding
games. Other papers have investigated multiple-machine sequencing situations. Van den
Nouweland et al. (1992) considered sequencing situations in ﬂow-shops while Hamers et
al. (1999) and Slikker (2005, 2006) studied sequencing situations with multiple parallel
machines.
The manufacturing systems considered in all studies above consist only of machines
which can process no more than one job at a time. Although these models are realistic for
many existing manufacturing systems, there are also various systems which include batch
machines: machines that can simultaneously process multiple jobs (a batch) subject to the
capacity of the machine. Transportation of the semi-ﬁnished jobs from one machine to
another or the delivery of the ﬁnished jobs to the customers/warehouses (cf. Lee and Chen,
2001) constitute very common examples of batch machines in manufacturing systems since
transporters, i.e., the machines in these operations usually carry a batch of jobs at the same
time. Other well-known examples include heat-treat ovens which can process multiple jobs
with the same processing requirement (temperature, processing time etc.) simultaneously
in a batch (cf. Lee et al., 1992) and also numerically controlled (NC) routers which cut a
stack of metal sheets simultaneously during the cutting operation (cf. Ahmadi et al., 1992).
We refer to Webster and Baker (1995) and Potts and Kovalyov (2000) for a review of the
scheduling literature on batch sequencing.
This paper aims to present a ﬁrst game theoretical analysis of the cost allocation prob-
lems in batch sequencing situations. We ﬁrst consider sequencing situations with a single
batch machine. These situations give rise to the class of so-called batch sequencing games.
1It is shown that these games are convex: an agent’s marginal contribution does not decrease
if he joins a larger coalition. In particular, we show that these games can be written as
a non-negative linear combination of unanimity games. This observation also leads to an
expression for the Shapley value of these games. We also consider an equal gain splitting
rule and provide an axiomatic characterization of this rule by using eﬃciency, symmetry
and consistency axioms along the lines of Suijs et al. (1997) and Gerichhausen and Hamers
(2008).
Finally, we consider sequencing situations in ﬂow-shops which consist of a sequence
of ﬁnitely many batch machines. We show that when each batch machine has the same
batch size or when each batch machine has the same batch processing time, the associated
cooperative batch sequencing game is equal to the batch sequencing game corresponding
one particular batch machine in the ﬂow-shop. Hence, the games corresponding to these
two special classes are convex. However, it is also shown that the games corresponding to
batch sequencing situations in ﬂow-shops are not convex in general.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 recalls some basic notions and results
from cooperative game theory. Section 3 describes batch sequencing situations with a single
batch machine. Section 4 introduces the corresponding batch sequencing games and presents
our main results. Section 5 introduces and analyzes ﬂow-shop batch sequencing situations
and corresponding games.
2 Preliminaries
A cooperative game is a pair (N,v), where N is a nonempty, ﬁnite set of players and v is a
mapping, v : 2N → R with v(∅) = 0. The mapping v assigns to every coalition S ⊂ N its
worth v(S). A game (N,v) is monotonic if v(T) ≥ v(S) for every S,T ∈ 2N with S ⊂ T
and it is called superadditive if v(S)+v(T) ≤ v(S ∪T) for every S,T ∈ 2N with T ∩S = ∅.
A game (N,v) is convex if a player’s marginal contribution does not decrease if he joins a
larger coalition, i.e., v(T ∪{i})−v(T) ≥ v(S∪{i})−v(S) for every i ∈ N and S,T ⊂ N\{i}
with S ⊂ T.
The core C(v) of a game (N,v) is deﬁned as the set of eﬃcient allocations for which no
coalition has an incentive to split oﬀ from the grand coalition, i.e.,
C(v) = {x ∈ RN|
 
i∈N
xi = v(N) and
 
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S) for all S ∈ 2N}.
A game with a nonempty core is called balanced. In particular, convex games are balanced.
For any coalition T ∈ 2N\{∅}, the unanimity game uT is deﬁned by uT(S) = 1 if T ⊂ S
and uT(S) = 0 for all other coalitions S. It is well known that every cooperative game







T⊂S(−1)|S|−|T|v(T) for every S ⊂ N (cf. Shapley, 1953).
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) is one of the most important solution concepts in
cooperative game theory and has been studied extensively. The Shapley value of a game can
be calculated by making use of the decomposition of a cooperative game into unanimity
games. More precisely, given a cooperative game (N,v), the Shapley value Φ assigns to







for every i ∈ N.
An order on the players is a bijection σ : N → {1,...,n}. We denote the set of all
orders on N by ΠN. A coalition S is called connected with respect to σ if for all i,j ∈ S
and k ∈ N such that σ(i) < σ(k) < σ(j) it holds that k ∈ S. We denote with con(σ) the
set of coalitions that are connected with respect to σ. For a coalition S, S\σ is the set
of σ-components of S, a σ-component of S being a maximally connected subset of S with
respect to σ. We call a cooperative game (N,v) σ-component additive if it satisﬁes the
following three conditions:
(i) v(i) = 0 for all i ∈ N,




Le Breton et al. (1992) showed that σ−component additive games are balanced.
3 Batch Sequencing Situations
In a batch sequencing situation a ﬁnite number of agents, each having one job, are queued
in front of a single batch machine, waiting for their jobs to be processed. The set of agents
is denoted by N = {1,2,...,n}. The machine can process one batch of jobs at one time.
At most z ∈ Z++ jobs can be placed in one batch. Each batch is processed in t time units
which is independent of the number of jobs placed in the batch. We assume that there is
an initial order σ0 on the agents before the processing of the machine starts. Speciﬁcally,
σ0(i) = j means that agent i is in position j. For each agent i ∈ N, the costs of spending
time in the system is assumed to be linear and the corresponding cost function ci : R+ → R
is deﬁned by ci(k) = αik with αi > 0.
A batch sequencing situation as described above is denoted by Γ(N) = (N,σ0,α,z,t)
where σ0 ∈ ΠN, α = (αi)i∈N ∈ RN
++, z ∈ Z++ and t ∈ R++.
In a batch sequencing situation Γ(N) = (N,σ0,α,z,t), it can easily be observed that
as long as there is a suﬃcient number of jobs to ﬁll up a batch, it is proﬁtable to run full
batches of size z on the machine. Hence, the ﬁrst z jobs are placed in the ﬁrst batch to be
3processed by the machine, the following z jobs are placed in the second batch and so on.





gives the number of the
batch that the job of agent i is placed in1. Hence the completion time C(σ,i) of the job of






The total costs of all agents if the jobs are processed according to the order σ equal
 
i∈N αiC(σ,i). By reordering the jobs the total costs can be reduced. Since the number of
possible orderings of jobs is ﬁnite, there exists an order for which total costs are minimized.
We call such an order optimal. The following proposition establishes the optimality of an
HWCF (highest waiting cost ﬁrst) order: a processing order in which jobs are processed in
nonincreasing order of the waiting cost parameters αi.
Proposition 3.1 An HWCF order is optimal for every batch sequencing situation.
Proposition 3.1 is a direct consequence of the independence of the batch processing time
from the composition of each batch and can be proved by using a straightforward argument
based on adjacent pairwise interchanges. Notice that the optimal order is unique up to
reorderings of the jobs in the same batch and up to reorderings of the jobs of the agents
with the same cost parameter.
4 Batch Sequencing Games
For a batch sequencing situation Γ(N) = (N,σ0,α,z,t), the costs of a coalition S with
respect to a processing order σ equal
 
i∈S αiC(σ,i). We want to determine the maximal
cost savings of a coalition S when its members decide to cooperate. For this aim, we have to
deﬁne which reorderings of the jobs of coalition S are admissible with respect to the initial
order. In this paper, we follow the approach of Curiel et al. (1989), which has become an
established line of research, and assume that an order σ is admissible for S with respect to
σ0 if P(σ,j) = P(σ0,j) for all j ∈ N\S, where for every τ ∈ ΠN the set of predecessors of
an agent j ∈ N with respect to τ ∈ ΠN is deﬁned as P(τ,j) = {i ∈ N|τ(i) ≤ τ(j)}. The
set of admissible reorderings of a coalition S is denoted by A(S).
The value of a coalition S is deﬁned as the maximum cost savings coalition S can
achieve by means of an admissible reordering. Formally, the batch sequencing game (N,v)















   
, (2)
for every S ⊂ N.
Clearly, batch sequencing games are monotonic and superadditive. Notice that, by
deﬁnition of an admissible ordering, a coalition S can produce cost savings only by changing
positions within σ0-components. Hence, the value of a coalition S is equal to the sum of
1⌈q⌉ denotes the smallest integer which is greater than or equal to q for any real number q ∈ R.
4the values of its σ0-components, i.e., v(S) =
 
T∈S\σ0 v(T). Notice further that one-person
coalitions can not generate any cost savings, i.e., v({i}) = 0 for every i ∈ N. So, batch
sequencing games are σ0-component additive and hence they are balanced.
In the following, we will denote by σS ∈ ΠN an ordering which is attained from σ0 by
reordering the members in each σ0-component of a coalition S with respect to the HWCF
rule, i.e., σS(i) = σ0(i) for every i ∈ N\S and σS(i) < σS(j) for every T ∈ S\σ0 and every
i,j ∈ T such that αi > αj. Clearly, σS ∈ A(S). Moreover, it follows by Proposition 3.1 and















for every S ⊂ N.
Example 4.1 Consider the batch sequencing situation Γ(N) = (N,σ0,α,z,t) with N =
{1,2,...,7}. Assume that σ0 is given by σ0(i) = i for every i ∈ N, α = (1,3,4,6,8,9,12)
z = 2, and t = 1. Consider the coalition S = {2,3,5,6,7}. It can easily be observed that
σS = (1,3,2,4,7,6,5). The orders σ0 and σS are depicted in Figure 1.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 σ0
1 3 2 4 7 6 5 σS















= α2(1 − 2) + α3(2 − 1) + α5(3 − 4) + α6(3 − 3) + α7(4 − 3) = 5.
⋄
In the following, we will show that batch sequencing games can be written as a non-
negative linear combination of unanimity games. For this aim, we ﬁrst need the following
notation and two lemmas.
Let Γ(N) = (N,σ0,α,z,t) be a batch sequencing situation and let (N,v) be the cor-
responding batch sequencing game. For any coalition T ⊂ N, we will denote the member
of T which stands in front of the other members of T with respect to σ0 by f(T) and the
member which stands behind the other members of T by l(T), i.e.,
f(T) = argmini∈T σ0(i) and l(T) = argmaxi∈T σ0(i).
For every agent i ∈ N and an order σ ∈ ΠN, the number of the batch that the job of




= k. Also we denote by (N,vσS) the batch sequencing game corresponding to the
batch sequencing situation (N,σS,α,z,t) for any S ⊂ N.
5Lemma 4.1 Let Γ(N) = (N,σ0,α,z,t) be a batch sequencing situation and S,T ⊂ N such
that S ⊂ T. Then,
v(T) = v(S) + vσS(T).
Proof.


























































where the second equality follows from the fact that σ0(i) = σS(i) for every i ∈ T\S. ¤
We will also make use of the following lemma, proved by Borm et al. (2002), which
characterizes the coeﬃcients in the unique linear decomposition of a σ0-component additive
game into unanimity games.
Lemma 4.2 (Borm et al., 2002, Proposition 1) Let (N,v) be a σ0-component additive
game and let
 
S⊂N λSuS be the linear decomposition of (N,v) into unanimity games. Then,
for every coalition S ⊂ N
λS =
 
v(S) − v(S\{f(S)}) − v(S\{l(S)}) + v(S\{f(S),l(S)}), if S ∈ con(σ0),
0, otherwise.
In the following proposition, we show that in case of batch sequencing games the formula
provided by Lemma 4.2 boils down to an expression in terms of the diﬀerences between
certain players’ waiting cost parameters. More speciﬁcally, Proposition 4.1 reveals that
the coeﬃcient of a connected coalition S is equal to the sum of diﬀerences between the
weight of the last player of a batch with respect to σS and the weight of the ﬁrst player
of the subsequent batch with respect to σS, where the sum is taken over all batches that
are crossed by both the ﬁrst and the last players of S with respect to σ0 when the order
changes from σ0 to σS.
Proposition 4.1 Let Γ(N) = (N,σ0,α,z,t) be a batch sequencing situation. Let (N,v) be
the corresponding batch sequencing game and let
 
S⊂N λSuS be the linear decomposition








S (kz) − ασ−1
S (kz+1)), if bσS(l(S)) < bσS(f(S)),
0, otherwise.
6Proof. Let S ⊂ N be a connected coalition with respect to σ0. Let us denote f(S) by i,
l(S) by j and S\{f(S),l(S)} by S′. By using Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2, we obtain
λS = v(S) − v(S\{i}) − v(S\{j}) + v(S′),
= (vσS\{i}(S) + v(S\{i})) − v(S\{i}) − (vσS′(S\{j}) + v(S′)) + v(S′),
= vσS\{i}(S) − vσS′(S\{j}).























S′ (kz+1) − αi). (3)
Observe also that ασ−1
S\{i}(kz+1) = ασ−1
S′ (kz+1) for every k such that bσ0(i) ≤ k < bσS(j).











S′ (kz+1) − αi). (4)
It immediately follows from equation (4) that λS = 0 when bσS(j) ≥ bσS(i). So, assume
that bσS(j) < bσS(i). Observe that bσS(i) is either equal to bσS\{j}(i) or equal to bσS\{j}(i)+1.











S (kz) − ασ−1
S (kz+1)),
where the second equality follows from the fact that ασ−1
S\{i}(kz+1) = ασ−1
S (kz) and ασ−1
S′ (kz+1) =
ασ−1
S (kz+1) for every k such that bσS(j) ≤ k < bσS(i).








S′ (kz+1)) + t (ασ−1





S (kz) − ασ−1
S (kz+1)) + t (ασ−1






S (kz) − ασ−1
S (kz+1)).





S (kz+1)) when bσS(j) <
bσS(i). ¤
We illustrate the expression provided by Proposition 4.1 in the following example.
Example 4.2 Take the batch sequencing situation Γ(N) considered in Example 4.1. Let
(N,v) be the batch sequencing game corresponding to Γ(N) and consider the coalition S =
{1,2,...,6}. We will calculate λS, the coeﬃcient corresponding to S in the decomposition
of (N,v) into unanimity games. Obviously, f(S) = 1, l(S) = 6 and σS = (6,5,4,3,2,1,7)
(See Figure 2).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 σ0
6 5 4 3 2 1 7 σS
Figure 2: The orders σ0 and σS in Example 4.2
Observe that the job of agent 1 is processed in the third batch and the job of agent 6 is
processed in the ﬁrst batch with respect to σS. That is bσS(l(S)) = 1 and bσS(f(S)) = 3.
Since bσS(l(S)) < bσS(f(S)), by Proposition 4.1
λS = (ασ−1
S (2) − ασ−1
S (3)) + (ασ−1
S (4) − ασ−1
S (5))
= (α5 − α4) + (α3 − α2) = (8 − 6) + (4 − 3) = 3.
The whole decomposition of (N,v) into unanimity games is provided below:
v = u{2,3} + 2u{4,5} + 3u{6,7} + 2u{1,2,3} + 2u{2,3,4} + 2u{3,4,5} + u{4,5,6} + u{5,6,7}
+u{1,2,3,4} + 3u{2,3,4,5} + 2u{3,4,5,6} + 5u{4,5,6,7} + 4uN\{6,7} + 3uN\{1,7}
+3uN\{1,2} + 3uN\{7} + 6uN\{1} + 5uN.
⋄
Proposition 4.1 reveals that batch sequencing games are nonnegative combinations of una-
nimity games. Since unanimity games are convex, this establishes the convexity of the batch
sequencing games. As a side result, we also obtain an expression of the Shapley value of
batch sequencing games.
Theorem 4.1 Let Γ(N) = (N,σ0,α,z,t) be a batch sequencing situation and let (N,v) be
the corresponding batch sequencing game. Then,
(i) (N,v) is convex.











In the remainder of this section, we introduce and characterize a non-aggregated equal
gain splitting (EGS) solution for batch sequencing situations. Non-aggregated solutions,
which are ﬁrst introduced by Suijs et al. (1997) for classical sequencing situations, can be
considered as a speciﬁcation of all components of the total reward an agent obtains. In our
setting, a non-aggregated solution Ψ is a map assigning to each batch sequencing situation
Γ(N) a matrix W ∈ RN×N
+ , where an element wij of W represents the nonnegative gain
assigned to agent i for cooperating with agent j. The aggregated solution corresponding to
W ∈ Ψ(Γ(N)) can be found by multiplying W with the vector eN of all ones in RN.
Let Γ(N) = (N,σ0,α,z,t) be a batch sequencing situation and (N,v) be the correspond-
ing batch sequencing game. Also let
 
S⊂N λSuS be the linear decomposition of (N,v) into
unanimity games. For any i,j ∈ N, let [i,j] be the set of all players in between i and
j with respect to σ0, i.e., [i,j] = {k ∈ N|min{σ0(i),σ0(j)} ≤ σ0(k) ≤ max{σ0(i),σ0(j)}}.
The non-aggregated equal gain splitting solution EGS assigns to each batch sequencing





for every i,j ∈ N.
Example 4.3 Consider the batch sequencing situation of Example 4.1. Recall that the de-
composition of the corresponding batch sequencing game into unanimity games is provided






   
 












2 0 0 1 1 3
2
1





























Now we introduce the notions of dummy agents and reduced batch sequencing situations
that will be used for the axiomatization of the EGS solution for batch sequencing situations.
Let Γ(N) = (N,σ0,α,z,t) be a batch sequencing situation. An agent i ∈ N is called a
dummy agent in Γ(N) if b(i) = bσS(i) for every S ⊂ N with i ∈ S, i.e., the job of agent
9i stays in its initial batch no matter which coalition of agents i cooperates with. Roughly
speaking, a batch sequencing situation reduced to a connected coalition S ∈ con(σ0) is a
batch sequencing situation obtained when the agents outside S are replaced with dummy
agents. Formally, a reduced batch sequencing situation with respect to S is described by
Γ|S(N) = (N,σ0,β,z,t) where β = (βi)i∈N ∈ RN
+ is such that βi = αi for every i ∈ S and
βj =
 
maxi∈N 2αi, if j < f(S),
mini∈N αi/2, if j > l(S),
for every agent j ∈ N\S.
Let Ψ be a non-aggregated solution for batch sequencing situations. We consider the
following three properties of Ψ.






αi (C(σ0,i) − C(σN,i)) for all batch sequencing situations Γ(N).
• Symmetry: Ψ is symmetric if Ψ(Γ(N)) is a symmetric matrix for all batch sequencing
situations Γ(N).
• Consistency: Ψ is consistent if for all batch sequencing situations Γ(N) and all
S ∈ con(σ0) the following is satisﬁed:
Ψ(Γ(N))ij = Ψ(Γ|S(N))ij for every i,j ∈ S.
The eﬃciency axiom states that the total amount allocated to the agents is equal to the
maximal total cost savings that the agents can jointly obtain. Symmetry states that the
(extra) gain two agents can obtain is equally divided among the two agents. Consistency
states that connected coalitions obtain the same division if they renegotiate on the basis of
the same solution concept to the reduced situation with outside dummies.
In Theorem 4.2 we will characterize the EGS solution with the three properties men-
tioned above. For the proof, we need the following lemma which states that, for non-
aggregate solutions that satisfy both eﬃciency and consistency, the total amount allocated
to connected coalitions must be equal to the maximal total cost savings that these coalitions
can achieve.
Lemma 4.3 Let Γ(N) = (N,σ0,α,z,t) be a batch sequencing situation and let Ψ be a non-






αi (C(σ0,i) − C(σS,i)),
for every S ∈ con(σ0).






αi (C(σ0,i) − C(σS,i)).






αi (C(σ0,i) − C(σS,i)),



















i,j∈S Ψ(Γ|S(N))ij since Ψ(Γ|S(N))ij ≥ 0
for every i,j ∈ N.






αi (C(σ0,i) − C(σS,i)).
Clearly, S  = N and there exists S1,S2 ∈ con(σ0) ∪ {∅} such that S1 ∩ S2 = ∅ and N\S =











αi (C(σ0,i) − C(σT,i)),
where the equality follows from Ψ being eﬃcient and the inequality follows from the fact

















αi (C(σ0,i) − C(σS2,i)).




i∈S αi (C(σ0,i) − C(σS,i)) leads to a contradiction. ¤
Theorem 4.2 The EGS solution is the unique non-aggregated solution satisfying eﬃciency,
symmetry and consistency.
11Proof. Obviously, EGS satisﬁes eﬃciency, symmetry and consistency.
Now let Ψ be a nonempty solution which satisﬁes eﬃciency, symmetry and consistency.
Pick a batch sequencing situation Γ(N) = (N,σ0,α,z,t). We will show that Ψ(Γ(N))ij is
uniquely determined for every i,j ∈ N with induction to the number |σ0(j) − σ0(i)|.
Pick i,j ∈ N. Assume ﬁrst that |σ0(j) − σ0(i)| = 0. Then, i = j and Ψ(Γ(N))ij =
0 = EGS(Γ(N))ij by Lemma 4.3. Now, assume that Ψ(Γ(N))ij = EGS(Γ(N))ij for every
i,j ∈ N with |σ0(j) − σ0(i)| ≤ k for some k ∈ {0,...,n − 2}. Pick i,j ∈ N such that
|σ0(j) − σ0(i)| = k + 1. Let S = [i,j]. Then,
Ψ(Γ(N))ij + Ψ(Γ(N))ji =
 
i∈S











where the ﬁrst equality follows from Lemma 4.3 and the second equality follows from
the fact that |σ0(p) − σ0(r)| ≤ k for every (p,r) ∈ S × S\{(i,j),(j,i)} and the induction
assumption.
Then Ψ(Γ(N))ij +Ψ(Γ(N))ji is determined uniquely. Consequently, by symmetry, Ψ is
uniquely determined and hence Ψ(Γ(N)) = EGS(Γ(N)). ¤
5 Flow-Shops with Batch Machines
Flow-shop batch sequencing (FSBS) situations consist of a sequence of ﬁnitely many batch
machines B1,B2,...,Bm and a ﬁnite number of agents N = {1,2,...,n} each having one job
to be processed in the order B1,B2,...,Bm. Each batch machine Bk has a batch size of
zk and processes a batch in tk time units independent of the number of jobs placed in the
batch. As it is the case in batching situations on a single batch machine, we assume that
there is an initial order σ0 on the jobs before the processing of the jobs on the ﬂow-shop
begins. That is if agent i is in front of agent j in the queue, then at all machines in the
ﬂow-shop, the job of agent i has to be processed before the job of agent j is processed or
together with the job of agent j in the same batch. An FSBS situation as described above
is denoted by Γ(N,M) = (N,M,σ0,α,z,t) where M = {1,2,...,m} and m ∈ Z++ is the
number of batch machines in the ﬂow-shop, σ0 ∈ ΠN, α = (αi)i∈N ∈ RN




For every FSBS situation, a production schedule τ ﬁxes for every agent i and for every
machine k a starting time Ti,k(τ) of the job of agent i at machine k. A production schedule
is feasible if it conforms to the batch capacity constraints of the machines, to the order of
the ﬂow-shop and to the order on the jobs. Formally, we call a production schedule feasible
with respect to the order σ ∈ ΠN if it satisﬁes the following:
(i) Ti,k(τ) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N and all k ∈ M.
12(ii) Ti,k(τ) + tk ≤ Ti,k+1(τ) for all i ∈ N and all k ∈ M.
(iii) If σ(i) ≤ σ(j), then Ti,k(τ) ≤ Tj,k(τ) for all i,j ∈ N and all k ∈ M.
(iv) |{i ∈ N|Ti,k(τ) = s}| ≤ zk for all k ∈ M and s ≥ 0.
(v) If Ti,k(τ)  = Tj,k(τ), then |Ti,k(τ) − Tj,k(τ)| ≥ tk for all i,j ∈ N and all k ∈ M.
We denote by Fi,k(τ) the time at which machine k ﬁnishes the processing of the batch
in which job i is placed, i.e., Fi,k(τ) = Ti,k(τ) + tk. Then, the completion time Ci(τ) of
job i under production schedule τ is Fi,m(τ). The total costs of all agents if the jobs are
processed according to the production schedule τ equal
 
i∈N αiFi,m(τ).
Example 5.1 Consider an FSBS Γ(N,M) = (N,M,σ0,α,z,t) where N = {1,...,5}, M =
{1,2}, σ0(i) = i for every i ∈ N, α = (1,7,1,1,1), z = (1,2) and t = (1,5). In Figure 3, we
depict two feasible production schedules with respect to the initial order σ0: τ0 and τ1.
τ0 :
B1 :
0 1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
B2 :




0 1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
B2 :
2 7 12 17 0
1,2 3,4 5
Figure 3: Two feasible schedules for the ﬂow-shop situation in Example 5.1
It can easily be observed that with respect to both schedules, every job is immediately
processed by B1 as soon as B1 is available. If the jobs are processed with respect to
production schedule τ0, then F1,1(τ0) = T1,2(τ0) = 1. That is job 1’s processing at B2 starts
as soon as its processing at B1 ends. If the jobs are processed with respect to production
schedule τ1, then F1,1(τ1) = 1 and T1,2(τ1) = T2,2(τ1) = 2. That is, with respect to
production schedule τ1, although job 1 is available for processing at B2 at time one, it waits
for one time unit for job 2 to become available for B2 and at time two their processing by
B2 starts together in the same batch. ⋄
Finding an optimal schedule for a general FSBS situation is still an open problem2.
However, as we establish in the following proposition, there always exists an optimal schedule
2For an FSBS situation with two machines and equal waiting time parameters, Ahmadi et al. (1992)
showed that the problem of ﬁnding the optimal schedule can be solved within O(N
3) operations.
13which processes the jobs according to the HWCF-sequence σN and runs full batches in the
ﬁrst batch machine.
Proposition 5.1 For every FSBS situation Γ(N,M) = (N,M,σ0,α,z,t), there exists an
optimal schedule τ such that
(i) τ is a feasible schedule with respect to σN.
(ii) τ runs full batches of size z1 in the ﬁrst batch machine.
We note that Proposition 5.1 can be proved by using a simple interchange argument.
Observe that there can be more than one production schedule which is feasible with
respect to the initial order in an FSBS situation. We assume in this study that, in the
initial case, i.e., when the agents do not cooperate, the corresponding initial production
schedule is the one in which no agent waits for another because waiting for other jobs,
without any further compensation, to get processed together in the same batch will only
increase the costs of the agent. That is the initial production schedule is the one which is
feasible with respect to σ0 and satisﬁes the condition that every job which is ready to be
processed at a machine is processed as soon as the machine is also available. We denote the
initial production schedule in ﬂow-shop batch sequencing situations by τ0 (Note that the
production schedule τ0 in Example 5.1 indeed ﬁts this description.).
Next, for a coalition of cooperating agents, we must decide on which production schedule
rearrangements are admissible. We assume that a coalition S can choose any production
schedule which is feasible with respect to an order σ ∈ A(S) as long as they do not harm
the players outside S. Formally, a production schedule τ is admissible for coalition S if it
satisﬁes the following two conditions:
(i) τ is a feasible production schedule with respect to an order in A(S).
(ii) Fi,m(τ) ≤ Fi,m(τ0) for all i ∈ N\S.3
The set of admissible production schedules for S is denoted by APS(S).
We deﬁne the value of a coalition S as the maximum cost savings coalition S can achieve
by means of an admissible production schedule. Formally, a ﬂow-shop batch sequencing






αi(Fi,m(τ0) − Fi,m(τ)), (5)
3Condition (ii) enables agents to wait for other agents’ jobs in order to get processed together in the
same batch. That is agents can create savings both by reordering their jobs and also by waiting for some
other jobs. Another option for admissibility of a rearrangement could be to require that Fi,m(τ) = Fi,m(τ0)
for all i ∈ N\S. Under this more restrictive condition, waiting would no longer be possible in a ﬂow-shop
batching situation, i.e., the agents could create savings only by reordering their jobs. We want to remark
that, under this more restrictive condition, the results obtained for single machine batch sequencing games
can easily be extended to corresponding ﬂow-shop batch sequencing games.
14for every S ⊂ N.
Using a simple interchange argument, it can be shown that there exists an optimal
admissible production schedule for S which is feasible with respect to σS. Recall that σS is
an ordering which is attained from σ0 by reordering the members in each σ0-component of
a coalition S with respect to the HWCF rule.
Clearly, FSBS games are monotonic and superadditive. However, as illustrated by the
following example, FSBS games are neither σ0-component additive nor convex in general.
Example 5.2 Consider the ﬂow-shop batch sequencing situation Γ(N,M) given in Exam-
ple 5.1 and the coalition S = {1,3,4,5}. The initial production schedule, τ0 is also given in
Example 5.1. Notice that S can not create savings just by reordering the jobs since αi = αj
for every i,j ∈ S. However, observe that τ1 in Example 5.1 is an admissible production
schedule for S (since F2,2(τ1) < F2,2(τ0)) and the cost savings obtained if S uses τ1 is:
 
i∈S




= (6 − 7) + (11 − 12) + (16 − 12) + (16 − 17) = 1.
So, when agent 1 waits for agent 2, the only agent outside S, agent 2 proﬁts from an
earlier completion time, agents 3 and 5 are harmed indirectly but agent 4 proﬁts. As a
result, S could obtain cost savings of 1. Actually, τ1 is the optimal production schedule for
S, i.e., w(S) = 1.
For T ∈ 2N\{S} one ﬁnds that: w(T) = 30 for every T ⊃ {1,2} and w(T) = 0 otherwise.
Observe that this FSBS game is not convex:
0 = w(N) − w({1,2,3,4}) < w({1,3,4,5}) − w({1,3,4}) = 1.
(N,w) is not σ0-component additive either: {1} and {3,4,5} are the σ0-components of
{1,3,4,5}, but
1 = w({1,3,4,5})  = w({1}) + w({3,4,5}) = 0.
⋄
In the following, we will examine two particular FSBS situations: situations where all
batch machines have the same batch size and situations where all batch machines have
the same batch processing time. First, it is shown that, in both of these situations, an
optimal order for a coalition of agents can be obtained by reordering the jobs of the agents.
That is although waiting for other jobs to produce savings is allowed in our model, in these
FSBS situations it need not be employed by the coalitions to obtain maximal cost savings.
Second, it is shown that the FSBS games arising from these situations are equal to the game
arising from the “bottleneck” machine in the ﬂow-shop: the machine with the highest batch
processing time when all machines have the same batch capacity and the machine with the
minimum batch capacity when all machines have the same batch processing time.
15We need the following notation in order to present our results. Consider an FSBS
situation Γ(N,M) = (N,M,σ0,α,z,t). We denote by Pk the sum of the ﬁrst k machines’
batch processing times, by ¯ t the maximum batch processing time and by ¯ z the minimum
batch size, i.e., Pk =
 k
p=1 tp, ¯ t = max{tk|k ∈ M} and ¯ z = min{zk|k ∈ M}. Lastly, we
denote by τσ the production schedule which is obtained from τ0 only by reordering the
agents with respect to σ. That is
Tσ−1(p),k(τσ) = Tσ−1
0 (p),k(τ0)
for every p ∈ {1,2,...,n} and k ∈ M.
Proposition 5.2 Let Γ(N,M) = (N,M,σ0,α,z,t) be an FSBS situation. If zk = z for
every k ∈ M or if tk = t for every k ∈ M, then τσS is an optimal production schedule for
every S ⊂ N.
Proof. First assume that zk = z for every k ∈ M and consider the initial production
schedule τ0. Observe that with respect to τ0 ﬁrst z jobs in the initial order σ0 are processed
together in the ﬁrst batch in each machine; the second z jobs in σ0 are processed together in
the second batch in each machine and so on. Since the initial production schedule τ0 runs
full batches in each machine in the ﬂow-shop, waiting for other jobs is not an option for
the players. We know that there exists an optimal production schedule for every coalition
S which is feasible with respect to σS. Then, clearly, τσS is an optimal production schedule
for any coalition S ⊂ N.
Now assume that tk = t for every k ∈ M and consider the initial production schedule
τ0. Observe that τ0 may run batches with less jobs than full capacity and the jobs in these
batches have the option to wait for other jobs to get processed together in the same batch.
However, observe that it is not possible to decrease the completion times of the other jobs
by waiting for them, because the batch processing time of each machine is the same. That
is the coalitions can not produce savings through waiting for other jobs. We know that
there exists an optimal production schedule which is feasible with respect to σS for every
coalition S. Then, since waiting is not proﬁtable, τσS is an optimal production schedule for
any coalition S ⊂ N. ¤
In Theorem 5.1 we show that in both of these FSBS situations the corresponding FSBS
games are equal to the batch sequencing game corresponding to the bottleneck machine in
the ﬂow-shop. For the proof, we need the following lemma which states that in both of
these FSBS situations the completion time of a job is determined up to a constant by the
bottleneck machine.
Lemma 5.1 Let Γ(N,M) = (N,M,σ0,α,z,t) be an FSBS situation.





− 1)¯ t for every i ∈ N and
every σ ∈ ΠN.





− 1)t for every i ∈ N and
every σ ∈ ΠN.





= 1. Clearly, i is processed






= 2, i.e., j is processed in the second batch by each machine. Let ¯ t[1,k] be
the maximum batch processing time among the ﬁrst k machines, i.e., ¯ t[1,k] = max{tl|l ∈
{1,2,...,k}}. We will show, by induction on k, that







¯ t[1,k] = Pk + ¯ t[1,k].
When k = 1, the assertion holds trivially. So, assume that the assertion holds for every
k < l. Then, Fj,l−1(τσ) = Pl−1 + ¯ t[1,l−1].
Now, if tl < ¯ t[1,l−1], then ¯ t[1,l] = ¯ t[1,l−1] and
Fj,l−1(τσ) = Pl−1 + ¯ t[1,l−1] > Pl−1 + tl = Pl = Fi,l(τσ),
i.e., the second batch’s processing at machine l−1 ﬁnishes after the ﬁrst batch’s processing
ﬁnishes at machine l. Hence, the second batch immediately starts to be processed by
machine l at time Fj,l−1(τσ). So,
Fj,l(τσ) = Fj,l−1(τσ) + tl = Pl−1 + ¯ t[1,l−1] + tl = Pl + ¯ t[1,l].
If tl ≥ ¯ t[1,l−1], then ¯ t[1,l] = tl. Also we have that
Fj,l−1(τσ) = Pl−1 + ¯ t[1,l−1] ≤ Pl−1 + tl = Fi,l(τσ).
That is the second batch’s processing at machine l − 1 ﬁnishes before the ﬁrst batch’s
processing ﬁnishes at machine l. Hence, the second batch starts to be processed by machine
l at time Fi,l(τσ). So, Fj,l(τσ) = Fi,l(τσ) + tl = Pl + tl = Pl + ¯ t[1,l].
Now, one can repeat the whole argument given above for a job which is processed
in the third batch by each machine, then for the fourth batch and so on to prove that





− 1)¯ t for every i ∈ N.
(ii) can be proven similarly. ¤
Theorem 5.1 Let Γ(N,M) = (N,M,σ0,α,z,t) be an FSBS situation and (N,w) be the
corresponding ﬂow-shop batch sequencing game.
(i) Let zk = z for every k ∈ M. Deﬁne Γ(N) = (N,σ0,α,z,¯ t) to be the batch sequencing
situation corresponding to the bottleneck batch machine and let (N,v) be the corre-
sponding batch sequencing game. Then, v = w.
(ii) Let tk = t for every k ∈ M. Deﬁne Γ(N) = (N,σ0,α, ¯ z,t) to be the batch sequencing
situation corresponding to the bottleneck batch machine and let (N,v) be the corre-
sponding batch sequencing game. Then, v = w.
17Proof. (i). We know by Lemma 5.1 that











for every S ⊂ N and every i ∈ N. Moreover, we know by Proposition 5.2 that in Γ(N,M)




































for every S ⊂ N.
(ii) can be proven similarly. ¤
References
[1] Ahmadi, J. H., Ahmadi, R. H., Dasu, S., Tang, C. S., (1992). Batching and scheduling
jobs on batch and discrete processors. Operations Research, 40: 750-763.
[2] Borm, P., Fiestras-Janeiro, G., Hamers, H., S´ anchez, E., Voorneveld, M., (2002).
On the convexity of games corresponding to sequencing situations with due dates.
European Journal of Operational Research, 136: 616-634.
[3] Curiel, I., Pederzoli, G., Tijs, S., (1989). Sequencing games. European Journal of
Operational Research, 40: 344-351.
[4] Curiel, I., Potters, J., Prasad, R., Tijs, S., Veltman, B., (1993). Cooperation in one
machine scheduling. Mathematical Methods of Operations Research , 38: 113-129.
[5] Gerichhausen, M., Hamers, H., (2008). Partitioning sequencing situations and games.
European Journal of Operational Research. (in press).
[6] Hamers, H., Borm, P., Tijs, S., (1995). On games corresponding to sequencing situ-
ations with ready times. Mathematical Programming, 70: 1-13.
[7] Hamers, H., Klijn, F., Suijs, J., (1999). On the balancedness of multimachine se-
quencing games. European Journal of Operational Research, 119: 678-691.
[8] Hamers, H., Klijn, F., van Velzen, B., (2005). On the convexity of precedence se-
quencing games. Annals of Operations Research, 137: 161-175.
[9] Le Breton, M., Owen, G., Weber, S., (1992). Strongly balanced cooperative games.
International Journal of Game Theory, 20: 419-427.
[10] Lee, C. Y., Uzsoy, R., Martin-Vega, L. A., (1992). Eﬃcient algorithms for scheduling
semiconductor burn-in operations. Operations Research, 40: 764-775.
18[11] Lee, C. Y., Chen, Z. L., (2001). Machine scheduling with transportation considera-
tions. Journal of Scheduling, 4: 3-24.
[12] van den Nouweland, A., Krabbenborg, M., Potters, J., (1992). Flow-shops with a
dominant machine. European Journal of Operational Research, 62: 38-46.
[13] Potts, N. C., Kovalyov, Y. M., (2000). Scheduling with batching: A review. European
Journal of Operational Research, 120: 228-249.
[14] Shapley, L. S., (1953). A value for n-person games. In: Kuhn, H.,W., Tucker, A.,W.,
(Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games II. Princeton Univ. Press. In: Annals
of Mathematics Studies, 28: 307-317.
[15] Slikker, M., (2005). Balancedness of sequencing games with multiple parallel ma-
chines. Annals of Operations Research, 137: 177-189.
[16] Slikker, M., (2006). Balancedness of multiple machine sequencing games revisited.
European Journal of Operational Research, 174: 1944-1949.
[17] Suijs, J., Hamers, H., Tijs, S., (1997). On consistency of reward allacation rules in
sequencing situations. In: Hanveld, K., Vrieze, O., and Kallenberg, L., (Eds.), Ten
Years LNMB, 223-232. Amsterdam: CWI Tract.
[18] van Velzen, B., (2006). Sequencing games with controllable processing times. Euro-
pean Journal of Operational Research, 172: 64-85.
[19] Webster, S., Baker, R. K., (1995). Scheduling groups of jobs on a single machine.
Operations Research, 43: 692-703.
19